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The Determinants of IPO-Related Shareholder Litigation:
The Role of CEO Equity Incentives and Corporate Governance
Xingli Li
This paper empirically examines whether CEO equity incentives as well as other
corporate governance mechanisms are related to the incidence of shareholder litigation.
Our study differs from previous studies, which have largely focused on seasoned firms,
by examining how CEO incentives at a firm's pre-IPO stage affect the incidence of IPO-
related shareholder litigation. We examine a sample of 81 U.S. IPO firms (issued
between 1997 and 2007) that are sued under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within
3 years of their IPO and an industry-size-year matched sample of 81 control firms. We
have assembled a novel, hand-collected data set that measures the lawsuit, corporate
governance, and firm characteristics of these 162 firms. We report a significant positive
association between the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and CEO equity
incentives, which is consistent with the idea that there is a "dark side" to executive equity
incentives. This association is robust to alternative model specifications, sample selection
criteria, and estimation methods. In addition, we find that the risk of being sued is higher
for firms whose board is dominated by insiders, whose CEOs are older, have a shorter
tenure, or who founded the firm.
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1. Introduction
Principal-agent theory, beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggests that
stock-based executive compensation and equity holdings help reduce agency conflicts by
aligning the interests of corporate managers with those of a firm's shareholders. Yet,
despite its allure and widespread use, stock-based compensation has come under
increased scrutiny since the early 2000s by being tied to numerous corporate scandals at
such firms as MCI WorldCom, Enron, and HealthSouth that involved earnings
manipulation and various other violations of the securities laws. In many of these cases,
managers hyped up their firm's share price through accounting fraud as well as
misrepresentations and omissions of adverse developments, only to exercise their options
and sell their stock holdings at elevated levels before revealing their firm's true financial
position.
Our study attempts to contrast the expected positive effects of equity-based
incentives with their disadvantages. Recent studies examine the unintended consequences
of equity-based incentives including earnings management (Ke, 2001; Gao and Shrieves,
2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), accounting re-
statements (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Harris and Bromiley, 2007;
Baber et al., 2009), accounting fraud (Erickson et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2009), and
class action lawsuits (Denis et al., 2006; Peng and Roell, 2008). To the best of our
knowledge, all prior studies that have related accounting irregularities and legal actions to
CEO incentives have focused on seasoned firms, while the relationship remains
unexplored for IPO firms. We aim to close this gap in the literature by providing the first
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study that examines the relation between the incidence of IPO-related class action
lawsuits and CEO equity incentives including incentives from pre-IPO options (defined
as options that are issued prior to an IPO and whose exercise price is not directly linked
to the offer price), and from pre-IPO equity ownership controlling for a variety of
variables that are related to IPO litigation risk. Pukthuanthong, Roll and Walker (2007)
suggest that EPO firms provide an ideal setting for studying executive managerial
compensation and firm performance. In the same vein, we believe that IPO firms present
us with a particularly fertile laboratory for studying how CEO incentives affect a firm's
likelihood to be sued for securities fraud in connection with their IPO. First, G?? firms
differ significantly from seasoned firms. As Bhabra and Pettway (2003) note,
"Information contained in a prospectus is often the first window to a potential investor
about the firm's past and its projected future performance" (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003,
pg. 370). Therefore, the level of information asymmetry tends to be higher for G?? firms
which, in turn, may give top executives a better opportunity to deceive the market.
Second, founders or professional managers who decide to take their firm public are likely
to confront a variety of new pressures that they haven't experienced before. On one hand,
they have to fulfill the often high expectations of underwriters, analysts, venture
capitalists, and outsiders. On the other hand, they are likely to experience a substantial
shift in their personal wealth functions as their compensation moves away from being
salary- and bonus-based to being closely tied to the firm's share price. These factors may
drive some top executives to portray their firms in an overly positive light and engage in
manipulative or fraudulent activities during the IPO process in order to meet outside
expectations or maximize their own wealth. Third, the use of IPO-related class action
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lawsuits is particularly appealing because these lawsuits tend to be defined more
narrowly (typically alleging misrepresentation or omissions in a firm's IPO prospectus)
than lawsuits against seasoned firms, which are typically much more diverse in nature.
Lastly, from the perspective of IPO investors, pursuing an IPO firm in court tends to be
less costly than pursuing a seasoned firm as lawsuits brought under Section 1 1 of the
1933 Act do not require them to prove that they relied on false or misleading information
or omissions in the offering statement.
In this paper, by examining IPO related class action lawsuits, we shed some light
on the question: Do firms in which CEOs have higher equity incentives face a higher risk
of class action lawsuits? As we use class action lawsuits as a proxy for executives
committing fraud, our findings should be particularly interesting to IPO investors who are
concerned about the potential loss they may encounter due to fraudulent information
provided in the prospectus that will boost up the offer price and may affect the future
performance of their G?? shares.
We analyze a sample of 81 U.S. IPO firms that went public between 1997 and
2007 and subsequently become the target of a shareholder class action lawsuit under
Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act and an industry-size-year matched control sample
of 81 non-sued IPO firms. We assemble a unique, hand-collected data set that contains
detailed information on the lawsuit characteristics, executive compensation and equity
ownership structure, and other corporate governance characteristics of these 162 firms.
Our findings support our main hypothesis that firms in which CEOs have more equity
incentives prior to the G?? are more likely to become the target of a securities class action
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after the IPO. This result is robust when we consider abnormal equity incentives, i.e.
equity incentives beyond the desired level. However, the positive association only
prevails in high tech firms and becomes insignificant when we focus our attention on
non-tech firms. When classifying lawsuits based on their alleged fraud allegations (i.e.
accounting-related cases vs. non-accounting cases), our results are similar in both
subsamples. In addition, we find evidence that IPO firms whose board is dominated by
insiders face a higher litigation risk. Consistent with Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and
Agrawal and Cooper (2009), but in contrast to Efendi et al. (2007), we do not find a
significant relationship between the incidence of litigation and the combination of the
CEO and chairmanship roles in a given firm. Finally, we find several CEO traits to be
related to the incidence of litigation. Specifically, firms with older CEOs, CEOs who
have a shorter tenure, or CEOs who also founded the firm are more likely to be sued in
connection with their IPO.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic
concepts pertaining to executive pay and shareholder litigation. Section 3 discusses the
related literature. Section 4 presents the underlying theory and hypotheses. Section 5
describes the data selection process and characteristics of IPO lawsuits. Section 6 details
the methodology used in this study. Section 7 provides the descriptive statistics and
univariate tests and reports results for our multivariate models. The final section offers
concluding remarks and gives suggestions for future research in this area.
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2. Concepts of executive pay and shareholder litigation
2.1. Executive pay
Executive compensation determines how top level managers of business
corporations are paid. The institutional aspect is that the board of directors is responsible
for designing compensation.1 Although pay practices are different across firms and
industries, executive pay packages typically include one or more of the following five
components: grants of stock, grants of long-term incentive plans (including restricted
stock plans and multi-year accounting-based performance plans), grants of restricted
stock, grants of stock options or stock appreciation rights (SAR),2 and cash compensation
(salary, bonuses, and other cash compensation) (Murphy, 1999; Ronen and Yaari, 2008).
Companies may offer shares to their top executives and employees (stock grants)
to align their interests with those of the company's shareholders. The original
entrepreneurs or top executives already own some of the companies' stocks prior to the
G??. However, they typically commit not to sell their personal holdings during a lockup
period that commonly lasts 90 to 180 days and in some cases even longer after the IPO.
Besides regular stock grants (usually called unrestricted stock grants (Balsam, 2002)),
stock grants can be restricted. An example of a restriction imposed upon a stock grant
might be that shares cannot be sold for a certain time period that usually lasts three or
1 Although boards of directors make all major decisions related to executive compensation, initial
recommendations for pay levels and new incentive plans are typically suggested by the company's human
resource department. These recommendations are usually sent to top executives for approval and revision
before they are passed on to the full board of directors for approval (Murphy, 1999).
2 Stock appreciation rights (SARs) typically reward employees or executives with cash payments based on
the increase in the value of a specified number of shares over a defined period of time. Similar to options,
employees or executives have flexibility in when to choose to exercise the SAR when they are in the
money. In contrast to options, employees or executives do not need to purchase and then sell the shares to
receive the profit. Instead, the corporation pays them, in cash or common stock, the excess of the current
market price of the shares over the aggregate exercise price (Balsam, 2002).
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four years (Cheng and Warfield, 2005) or before the firm reaches a specific performance
goal.
Executive stock options are contracts that provide executives the right to buy a
fixed number of shares at a specified exercise price during a pre-specified time period.
Typically, these stock options cannot be exercised immediately. Murphy (1999) reports
that the usual time span between the granting date and the exercise date is at least three
years and seldom more than five years (a typical restriction written in the prospectus is
that 25 percent of options issued are allowed to be vested in each of the four years
following the original granting date). In addition, if employees or executives leave the
company before exercising or vesting, the options are typically forfeited. When options
become exercisable or vested, managers can either hold exercisable options or exercise
the options and hold shares instead.
The two major components of cash compensation include an executive's base
salary and bonuses. The base salary is a minimum fixed payment the manager receives
irrespective of the performance of the company during a given year. This provides
management some level of insurance with respect to the minimum base compensation
they can expect to receive. A bonus, on the other hand, is only received by managers
when they or the firm achieve a certain performance target. Annual bonuses or contracts
that provide incremental cash compensation on top of this base salary are a significant
part of executive compensation (Holthausen et al., 1995). As survey data by Hay
Management Consultants (1991) shows, 91% of all publicly traded U.S. firms have some
type of annual bonus plans for senior-level executives. In addition, Hay (1991) finds that
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at least 80% of the CEO bonus is related to corporate financial performance. While
earnings are the most popular performance measure for annual bonus plans, ROI (return
on invested capital) is also broadly used.4
Executive pay in corporations has undisputedly increased in the last few decades,
while worker's pay has stagnated (Hengartner, 2006). The compensation of top
executives increased by 6.8 percent per year from 1980 to 2003 (Frydman and Saks,
2007). Hengartner (2006) reports that the average real pay for chief executive officers of
S&P 500 firms grew from U.S. $3.5 million in 1992 to U.S. $14.7 million in 2000. In
recent years, average real CEO pay constitutes around 8% of corporate profits for U.S.
firms (Balsam, 2002, pg. 262).
Suffering from the sub-prime financial crisis, chief executives at the largest U.S.
corporations received less total compensation in 2008 than in 2007. Specifically, the
average total compensation for CEOs dropped 6 percent from 11.07 million dollars in
2007 to 10.4 million dollars in 2008 (The American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, 2008).
2.2. Shareholder litigation
Firms that engage in fraudulent practices that mislead or deceive investors are
liable to be sued. In the last century as well as in recent years, U.S. Congress has issued
4 In practice, there may be exceptions under certain circumstances. During the recent financial crisis, for
example, CEOs in the three largest banks that received money through the federal government's Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) remained on the list of 200 top-paid CEOs in 2008. In addition, only 39 of
the 200 top-paid CEOs did not receive bonuses in 2008. (For details, see "Who Moved My Bonus?
Executive Pay Makes a U-Turn," The New York Times, April 5, 2009).
5 This section provides a general review of each act. For details on these rules and regulations, please refer
to information provided by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel (http://uscode.house.gov).
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several laws that aim to protect investors from managers' fraudulent behavior in primary
and secondary market transactions. There are four legal reforms that are often highlighted
in the literature (DuCharme et al., 2004; Peng and Roell, 2008).
The Securities Act of 1933 is the first major congressional law to regulate the
securities industry. It was enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the stock market crash
of 1929 and during the subsequent Great Depression. The major objectives of this act are
to make sure that investors receive significant information regarding securities offerings
and to prohibit deceit, misrepresentation, and other fraud in the sale of securities. If G??
investors feel that they have made an investment decision based on misleading or false
information disseminated by a company, they may sue the firm, the underwriter, or any
person who signed the registration statement under Section 1 1 of the Securities Act of
1933 (Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration Statement). In lawsuits brought
under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, the plaintiffs (investors) are not required to prove that
they relied on misleading or deceitful information in the offering registration statement.
Rather, the burden ofproof falls on the defendant firm.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs securities transactions in the
secondary market and regulates exchanges and broker-dealers. As such, it is different
from the Securities Act of 1933, which generally deals with primary market transactions.
Usually, firms and their executives are sued under Section 10b of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Manipulative and Deceptive Devices) by investors who believe
that they received false or misleading information or that the firm failed to disclose
materially relevant information. Unlike under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, under Section
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lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, investors must prove that the information they relied on was
flawed, and that this reliance led to their loss. In other words, the cost of proof falls on
the plaintiff(s). The Exchange Act has been amended several times towards the end of the
20th century. One of the most important reforms is the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995.
The Private Security Litigation Reform Act of1995 (PSLRA) raised the pleading
standards of Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to reduce the number
of "frivolous" securities lawsuits filed in federal courts. The essence of this act is that
investors cannot proceed with a case unless they can strongly prove the existence of
deliberate fraud, compared with Section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, under which a case could proceed with minimal evidence. It is difficult for
plaintiffs to obtain such evidence to proceed with a case.6 Johnson et al. (2007) find
evidence that the PSLRA was at least partially successful in discouraging frivolous
securities lawsuits and that suits have become more merit-based since then. However,
Choi (2007) finds that firms with smaller offerings or firms which engaged in fraud for
which no hard evidence is publicly announced are less likely to face private securities
class action litigation after the PSLRA. Based on this, he cautions that while the PSLRA
lowered the incidence of frivolous litigation, it also blocks meritorious suits.
6See Bloomberg's Bloomberg official website
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060 1 039&refer=columnist quinn&sid=axkhffRnncpIl
which notes that the PSLRA raised pleading standards in three specific ways: first, it imposed a
requirement that false statements be pleaded "with particularity"; second, it required that pleading create a
"strong inference" of scienter; and third, it demanded that plaintiffs prove loss causation. For more
information, see also the Office of the Law Revision Counsel (http://uscode.house.gov).
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed by Congress on July 30, 2002, after a
number of major corporate and accounting scandals that involved high profile firms such
as Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WorldCom. SOX was
characterized by former president George W. Bush as including "the most far-reaching
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."
The legislation established enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards,
management and public accounting firms and aimed to reinforce corporate accountability
and professional responsibility (SEC, 2002). Although it is not mandatory, any private
firm may wish to comply with the SOX financial framework requirements during their
preparation for an initial public offering (IPO).
3. Related literature
In this section, we briefly review the principal agency theory, both from a
theoretical perspective and in terms of the related empirical evidence. Next, we review
the literature regarding the unintended consequences of equity-based incentives including
earnings management, accounting restatements, SEC Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Actions and private securities litigation.
3.1. Principal agency theory
Since the late 1970s, agency theory has become one of the main theoretical
foundations that underlying studies of executive compensation (Hengartner, 2006). In a
corporation, outside shareholders who have no executive rights act as a principal to the
insiders (agents) who are in charge of the company. Inside managers and outside
shareholders can have divergent interests when managers only own a small percentage of
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the firm. Inside managers (agents) may seek to maximize their personal utility, which is
not aligned with shareholder value maximization. Therefore, a substantial body of
theoretical work, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), posits that agency problems
can be mitigated and firm value maximization is achieved when the risk-neutral manager
owns a large percentage of the firm. Following Jensen and Meckling's (1976) theoretical
work, several papers have investigated the role of equity-based compensation in resolving
agency problems. For example, Haugen and Senbet (1981) theoretically prove that the
agency problem can be effectively solved through a strategy that prudently combines call
and put options retained by the owner-managers and external financiers, respectively.
Other studies also show empirical results consistent with the incentive alignment view
(Brickley et al., 1985; Lewellen et al., 1985; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Mehran, 1995).
However, there are inconsistent results to the incentive alignment view under the formal
agency framework. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that, on average, an increase of
shareholder wealth of 1,000 dollars is only associated with an increase of 3.25 dollars of
total CEO wealth (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal7) over the period
1974-1986, which leads them to conclude that CEO equity incentives are too weak to
provide economically meaningful incentives. Yermack (1995) finds that agency theory
cannot explain the patterns of CEO stock option awards using a sample of 792 U.S.
public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Meulbroek (2001) questions the cost
efficiency of executive stock options towards incentive alignment as they argue that
undiversified managers will value their equity-based compensation less than their market
value and this deadweight loss empirically can be quite large. More recent theoretical
7 Managers who face poor performance are threatened by management dismissal, which therefore provides
value-increasing incentives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
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studies including Goldman and Slezak (2006), Crocker and Slemrod (2007), and Peng
and Roell (2008) consider two types of efforts by top managers in their models, which are
(1) increasing the stock price by increasing future cash flows and (2) increasing the stock
price by manipulating information.
Not surprisingly, given the discouraging evidence in support of the principal agent
theory, recent empirical studies have increasingly focused on the link between executive
incentives and their unintended or adverse consequences.
3.2. Equity incentives and earnings management
Equity-based holdings and compensation provide conflicting incentives to
manage earnings. As pointed out by Ronen and Yaari (2008, pg. 84), inflating earnings
appears to be optimal for short-horizon earnings management as the higher the market
price, the higher the value of one's holdings. However, the inflated market price makes it
difficult to earn a raise of compensation in the future. Therefore, long-horizon earnings
management should focus on deflating earnings. In general, most of the recent literature
supports the existence of earnings management that tends to be used to inflate earnings.
Gao and Shrieves (2002) use fixed-effect ordinary least squares regressions to
examine the relation between executive compensation and earnings management. Their
study differs from previous studies as they examine earnings management from a
comprehensive view of the compensation contract, rather than focusing on one or two
8 Healy (1985) is the first researcher to suggest that managers may decrease current reported earnings so as
to increase future compensation. Managers tend to select negative discretionary accruals to hoard reported
earnings for future use when earnings before discretionary accruals either fall sufficiently far below the
lower bound or above the upper bound specified in the bonus plan. However, subsequent researchers do
not support Healy's (1985) argument about deflating earnings when the earnings are too low (see. For
example, Holthausen, et al., 1995)
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particular items in the contract. They find that the size of current year stock options,
previous year in-the-money options, the incentive intensity of current year stock options,
and bonuses are positively related to the intensity of earnings management, as measured
by the absolute value of current discretionary accruals scaled by assets. However, they
only find weak support for a positive relationship between the incentive intensity of
restricted stock and earnings management intensity. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) do
not examine the relationship between each item in the compensation package and
earnings management; rather, they examine the association between CEO equity-based
incentives and earnings management while controlling firm characteristics and firm
industry classification. They find evidence that CEOs whose overall compensation is
more sensitive to their company's share price are often associated with companies that
show a higher level of earnings management. Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that
managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just
beat analysts' forecasts using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over
the 1993-2000 time period. Ke (2001) measures the upward and downward earnings
management associated with executive compensation in the same context using a probit
regression. He finds that the probability of reporting a small increase in earnings is
associated with an increase in CEO equity-based compensation incentives and a decrease
in a firm's book-to-market ratio.
There are only few studies that directly link managers' salary to the probability of
earnings management. The main reason may be the fact that salary's sensitivity to price
movement as a result of earnings management is zero during any given year. However,
9 Some exception exists when salary is adjusted according to reported earnings (Gao and Shrieves, 2002).
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although salary is fixed within a given year, it changes between years according to the
managers' performance. Murphy (1999) points out that risk-averse managers will
naturally prefer a dollar increase in base salary to a dollar increase in target bonus or
other compensation. Therefore, a high level of executive salary may lower the incentive
of managers to manipulate earnings. Gao and Shrieves (2002) postulate a non-positive
relationship between earnings management and the salary levies. Because of a "ratchet
effect"10, Ronen and Yaari (2008, pg.77) hypothesize that a new CEO has an incentive to
decrease income in the first year of his tenure. In addition, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find
that the intensity of earnings management is negatively related to salary but positively
related to bonuses.
Unlike salary, bonuses have received a lot of attention from academic researchers.
Of particular interest in recent years has been the link between bonuses and earnings
management. Healy (1985), one of the first academics who examined this topic, argues
that managers are able to increase their payoffs by inflating reported earnings. However,
they also have an incentive to deflate earnings when the economic earnings either already
yield the maximum bonus (i.e. they are above the upper bound), or are too low (below the
lower bound) for a manager to earn a bonus since they can save reported income by
deflating earnings for future use. Some papers find support for Healy' s hypothesis. For
example, Guidry et al. (1999) use business unit-level data instead of firm-level data to
reduce the aggregation problem arriving from firm level data and potential mixed effects
10 Ratchet effect: A company's good performance in a given year is "punished" in the subsequent year
because it is difficult for the company to achieve its target performance again in the future as the expected
benchmark performance increases.
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of long-term performance and stock-based incentive compensation effects. They find that
managers of business units in the "MID" portfolio make income-increasing discretionary
accruals relative to those in the "UPP" and "LOW" portfolios.11 However, some studies,
such as Gaver et al. (1995) and Holthausen et al. (1995) find no evidence that managers
manipulate earnings downwards when they are below the lower bound necessary to
receive any bonus. Rather, they find income smoothing, which suggests that when
earnings are low, managers favor income-increasing behavior.
3.3. Equity incentives and earnings restatements
Not all earnings management is illegal or should be considered as corporate fraud.
It is only when GAAP standards are violated that they are considered truly fraudulent
earnings manipulations. To differentiate between the two, several studies consider the
occurrence of earnings restatement to identify fraudulent firms. Burns and Kedia (2006)
identify 215 firms that restated earnings due to accounting irregularities identified by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) over the period 1995-2001. They find a positive
relation between the likelihood of a restatement being made and stock option
compensation but fail to find any significant association between other components of
CEO compensation (equity holdings, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and
salary plus bonus) and the likelihood to restate.
Efendi et al. (2007) differ in their methodology from Burns and Kedia (2006)
because not only do they use a binary logistic regression, but also they employ an ordered
11 Guidry et al. (1999) construct three portfolios based on the relative size of bonuses paid to the firm's
managers. Firms in the lower bound portfolio (LOW) include those in which business-unit managers
receive no bonus for the current year. Firms in the upper bound portfolio (UPP) are those in which
business-unit managers earned their maximum available bonus. Firms in the middle bound portfolio (MID)
cover those firms in which some, but less than the maximum available bonus is earned.
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logistic regression that takes the seriousness of the restatement into consideration. They
report similar findings that suggest that the probability of a misstated financial statement
increases significantly when the CEO holds a large number of in-the-money stock
options. In addition, they find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement
increases when the firm is financially more constrained, raises new debt or equity capital,
or has a CEO who also chairs the board of directors.
Other studies that examine equity incentives and the incidence of earnings
restatements include Harris and Bromiley (2007) and Baber et al. (2009). The samples of
these papers overlap completely in observation years, but report surprisingly different
results. The former fails to find a relation between the incidence of accounting
restatements and the ratio of option compensation to total compensation while the latter
finds a positive statistical association between these variables.
3.4. Equity incentives and accountingfraud
Most of the aforementioned studies relate to compensation and financial reporting
incentives. Yet, the body of research that examines real fraud or shareholder litigation is
still relatively small to date. As indicated before, not all earnings management misleads
investors and in turn leads to allegations of accounting fraud or shareholder litigation.
Similarly, not all financial restatements indicate accounting irregularities. Rather, most of
them are routine (Efendi et al., 2007). The GAO report (2002) states that the so-called
accounting irregularities they identify do not rule out the unintentional misuse of facts
applied to financial statements, arising from different interpretations of complex GAAP
rules. The possibility that restatements may be made to correct unintended errors rather
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than dishonest misreportings clearly adds noise to any study that uses earnings
restatements as a proxy for fraud. To counter this disadvantage and more accurately
identify pernicious accounting fraud, some academic researchers examine firms that have
actually been accused of fraud in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAER) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Dechow et al. (1996)
point out that the agency only pursues cases where it can demonstrate that firms
knowingly and intentionally engaged in accounting fraud.
Erickson et al. (2006) collect a sample of 50 firms that are both accused of fraud
by the SEC action and for which they have compensation data during the period 1996 to
2003. They match these accused firms with two other firms not accused of fraud by
industry (two-digit SIC code), year, and firm size (total assets). Applying unconditional
logistic regression, they find no consistent evidence that executive equity-based
incentives are associated with fraud. They also find no evidence that the managers of
these fraudulent firms sell more stock or exercise more options during the alleged fraud
period. Johnson et al. (2009) collect a sample of firms that were accused of fraud in
connection with an AAER action by the SEC during the years 1992-2005. They match
these accused firms with a sample of non-sued "innocent" firms that are in the same
industry and have a similar size.12 Applying conditional logistic regression, they find that
firms in which executives hold more unrestricted stocks and thus have a higher incentive
to manage earnings are more likely to be investigated for fraud via an SEC action after
12 In our study, we consider private securities class action lawsuits to proxy for an IPO firm's potential
offer price inflation. While some prior studies (e.g.. Pukthuanthong, Turtle, and Walker, 2009) argue that
some securities class actions may be unmerited and driven by opportunistic behavior on behalf of the
plaintiffs and their law firms, they arguably provide a better proxy for securities fraud in an IPO context
than earnings restatements or SEC actions. In fact, both earnings restatement and SEC actions are rare for
IPO firms because prior to their IPO, issuing firms are not subject to the same disclosure requirements as
publicly traded firms.
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Controlling for firm governance, firm characteristics, and CEO characteristics. At the
same time, however, the authors find no significant relationship between litigation risk
and executive holdings of restricted stock and unvested and vested options. These results
are in the contrast with Erickson et al. 's (2006) findings, which they attribute to the
different methodology they use (conditional logistic regression rather than unconditional
logistic regression).13
3.5. Equity incentives andprivate securities litigations
Other papers focus on actual litigations as identified by private securities
litigations rather than SEC enforcement actions. The benefit of using private securities
litigation as pointed out by Peng and Roell (2008) is that they capture a potentially
broader set of manipulative activities, which are not limited to accounting fraud (e.g. they
include misleading revenue projections, failure to disclose material information, etc.)
Denis et al. (2006) collect class action lawsuit data from the Securities Class
Action Alert and Stanford's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and executive
compensation data from the Compustat Executive Compensation Database (ExecuComp)
between 1993 and 2002 and report a significant positive relation between a firm's
likelihood of being sued and the executive incentives from stock options. Furthermore,
they consider outside blockholders and institutional ownership and find that the incentive
provided by stock options to commit fraud is exacerbated by higher institutional and
block ownership.
Our results are robust to using either a conditional or unconditional logistic regression approach.
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Peng and Roell (2008) collect 479 class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and
2002 using the same databases as Denis et al. (2006). They find similar results that
suggest that incentive pay in the form of options increases a firm's probability of being
the subject of a securities class action after controlling for various firm characteristics.
Overall, prior empirical evidence in the extant literature in this area tends to favor
the view that there is a "dark side" of executive incentives, which leads to unintended or
adverse consequences and a cost for shareholders.
4. Underlying theory and hypothesis development
Becker's (1968) economic theory of crime suggests that a person commits fraud
not because his basic motivation differs from that of others, but because his benefits and
costs differ. A similar framework has been used by Efendi et al. (2007), Denis et al.
(2006), and Johnson et al. (2009). By focusing on the role of the CEO as a self-interested
agent, we assume that the decision to commit fraud is influenced by the top executive's
personal assessment of the expected payoffs from the fraud less the expected costs
associated with the detection of the fraud. In particular, similar to Denis et al. (2006), we
hypothesize that the expected payoffs are affected by the executive's compensation and
equity ownership structure. Consistent with the information asymmetry theory, we further
assume that insiders, who have more information than outsiders - especially for an IPO
firm which has never been public before - are able to deceive the market to inflate the
offer price by manipulating company information.
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Executives may be granted options prior to the IPO (pre-IPO options) or at the
time of the IPO (IPO options). Fife (1995, pg. 64) points out that "before an IPO, major
value-creating initiatives include developing new products and markets, obtaining
regulatory approvals, increasing the size and quality of earnings, exhibiting a strong
growth pattern and establishing a credible management team." All these actions are
expected to generate interest among potential investors and thus produce high price
multiples at the IPO. However, Fife also notes that executives will only be motivated to
increase the firm's marketable value when they receive pre-IPO options (which usually
have a discounted exercise price), but not through IPO options (for which the exercise
price equals the offer price) as IPO options will not incorporate the value that
management generated prior to the offering. In other words, the executives will not be
rewarded for the value increase that took place prior to the IPO by receiving an IPO
option grant. Therefore, executive pre-IPO options as well as equity ownership tie an
executives' wealth to the firms' stock price and in turn provide the executive with the
financial incentive to inflate the company's offer price. As pre-G?? stock option grants
and equity ownership increase, the expected payoff from fraud increases. IPO options
may not provide incentives for executives to inflate the offer price; however, we add a
dummy variable to control for their effect if any.
All firms may engage in value-creating activities prior to their IPO and show the
results of those activities in the registration statements to the public. Investors will rely on
that information to value the price of the company's stock. By using private securities
litigation to identify fraudulent firms, we focus on cases in which executives cross the
threshold within which there are no criminal or civil penalties for value-creating
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activities. This distinction is important because in many cases, it is impossible to observe
managerial fraud. We infer manipulation from observing "extreme" outcomes (legal
action) where manipulation is likely to have occurred. One concern with this
measurement method is that in some cases, it may incorrectly classify a firm as
fraudulent even though the lawsuit against it was unmerited. Similarly, if fraud was
committed but not revealed, then a firm may be classified as innocent. The potential for
misclassification is a limitation of our study as well as previous studies that use
accounting restatements or information on SEC AAER actions to identify fraud.
Based on the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: BPO firms in which a CEO has higher equity incentives face a higher risk
of litigation than comparable firms in which a CEO has less equity incentives.
Effective monitoring of the CEO by the board of directors is likely to reduce the
incidence of a lawsuit. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) indicate that board effectiveness is
a function of its independence and the greatest factor affecting the effectiveness is the
board's independence from the CEO. However, in many companies, the CEO also serves
as chairman of the board. Jensen (1993) argues that a CEO cannot perform the chair's
monitoring function apart from his or her personal interest and argues that as a result, it is
important to separate the roles of chairman and CEO. In line with this argument, Efendi
et al. (2007) find that accounting restatements are more likely to be made by firms in
which the CEO serves as chairman of the board of directors.
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Boards which are dominated by inside directors lack the monitoring by outside
directors, and in turn may be more likely to manipulate information. Along those lines,
Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms accused of accounting fraud by the SEC are more
likely to have insider-dominated boards. Similarly, Beasley (1996) finds that a greater
percentage of outside directors correlates with a lower likelihood of fraud. However,
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Johnson et al. (2009) do not find outside directorship to
significantly reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud or earnings restatements. Based on
the discussion above, we propose the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: G?? Firms in which boards are dominated by insiders face a higher risk of
litigation than comparable firms.
Hypothesis 3: IPO Firms in which a CEO holds the position of board chairperson face a
higher risk of litigation than comparable firms.
5. Data
5. 1. IPO and litigation data
During our sample formation, we consider all initial public offerings from January
1, 1997, to December 31, 2007, as identified in the Global New Issues database of
Thomson Financial's Security Data Company (SDC). IPOs by closed-end funds, REITs,
financial firms (with SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6900), unit offerings, reverse
LBOs, spinoffs, ADRs, and foreign issues are excluded as their institutional
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characteristics are fundamentally different from those of a typical IPO firm. After these
exclusions, our dataset contains a total of 2,268 IPOs.
Firms that faced a class action suit are identified through Stanford University's
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http !//securities . Stanford.edu) and the Securities
Class Action Alert. After reading the summary of each case, we only collect IPO-related
lawsuits, defined as suits that allege fraud relating back to disclosures made prior to the
G?? and that include the IPO date in the class period (Choi, 2007). We exclude class
action suits brought as part of the recent wave of IPO laddering litigations in which
underwriters, rather than issuers, are alleged to be the principal wrongdoers. For each
case, we also collect the lawsuit filing date, the class action period, and the case
summary. Among the 2,268 firms in our 1997-2007 IPO sample, we identify 86 firms
that were sued in connection with their IPO. Court dockets for these cases were obtained
from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database, a web-based
service by the U.S. department of Justice that provides access to case information online.
(http ://pacer.psc.uscourts. gov).
5.2. Matchingprocedure
We match each of the 86 firms in our sued IPO sample with a non-sued control
firm that was not the subject of an IPO-related class action lawsuit using the following
14 SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6999 represent financial service companies facing different regulations
than other firms (Choi, 2007). Spin-off IPOs and reverse LBOs may present companies with different
financial needs and different managerial objectives than other IPOs. Foreign issuers are excluded as we
concentrate on domestic IPOs. A unit represents a combination of securities, such as common stock and
warrants and is therefore excluded.
15 In a laddering litigation, plaintiffs generally contend that underwriters engaged in illegal tactics by either
receiving undisclosed greater compensation from investors or requiring investors in IPOs to agree to
purchase additional shares immediately following the IPO at pre-determined prices to artificially inflate the
price of the stock.
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matching procedure. First, for each sued IPO firm we identify all non-sued IPO firms in
the same industry based on the firm's two-digit SIC code. Second, we only select firms
that had their G?? during the same EPO year as the sued firms. Finally, out of these
industry-and-year matched firms we choose the firm that is closest to the sued firm in
terms of total assets in the most recent fiscal year prior to the IPO (used as a proxy for
size). If the total assets of the control firm are not within 50% of the total assets of the
sued IPO firms, we drop the observation. Using this matching procedure, we find
matching firms for 81 of our sued D?0 firms. Therefore, we get our final sample of 162
firms.
5.3. Executive compensation data
We hand-collect executive compensation data from each firm's IPO prospectus
(424B form) and proxy statement as posted on the SECs Electronic Data Gathering and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system. In addition, we use prospectuses and proxy statements to
obtain information on options held by the chief executive officers at the time immediately
prior to the IPO. A pre-IPO option is defined as an option issued prior to the IPO, and
whose exercise price is not directly linked to the IPO offer price. Similar to Lowry and
Murphy (2007), an G?? option is defined as an option whose exercise price is directly
linked to the G?? offer price. In some cases, options granted several days before the IPO
date are also treated as IPO options rather than pre-IPO options if their exercise price is
explicitly linked to the offer price. In some slightly ambiguous cases (e.g., the exercise
price is 80% or 110% of the offer price), we refer to the text of the prospectus to
determine whether it was in fact an G?? option or a pre-IPO option.
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Executive ownership data is also obtained from the IPO prospectus. Specifically,
we collect information on the number of shares owned by the chief executive officer prior
to the IPO. In order to better capture the CEO incentives from equity ownership, we
include not just information on the CEO's direct ownership but also on the ownership by
the CEO's immediate family members, and shares in trusts associated with the CEO.
We also collect details on firm and offer characteristics including the issue date,
firm auditors and underwriters, the registered dollar amount of the offer, as well as
information on VC backing and the exchange where a firm lists from the SDC and verify
the accuracy of the respective data with information contained in each firm's
prospectus.16 Governance variables including board size, the percentage of insiders on the
board, a CEO-chair dummy, and CEO traits including CEO age, CEO tenure, and a CEO
founder dummy are collected from the IPO prospectus. Accounting variables including
total assets (TA), operating income before depreciation (OIBD), total debt (TD), tangible
assets (PPE), and R&D expenses are collected from Compustat, with missing data filled
in according to data in the IPO prospectus. Finally, first-day closing prices are collected
from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database.
5.4. Characteristics ofIPO lawsuits
Table 1 provides information on the distribution of all IPOs as well as our
subsample of sued IPOs across years and industries. From Panel A, we can observe that
IPO volume was highest in 1997 with 477 IPOs and reached its lowest level in 2003 with
54 IPOs. Only 2% of the G?? firms that went public in 2003 were subsequently sued
16 We thank Jay Ritter for making data on underwriter ranks and firm ages available on his website
("http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm) .
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compared with over 6% of the 2007 IPOs. Similar to the findings of Lowry and Shu
(2002), we find no systematic relation between the total number of IPOs and the number
of lawsuits against IPO firms although they vary over the sample period. From Panel B,
we find that 47 lawsuits out of the 81 cases in our sued IPO sample are against firms in
the communications, computers, and electronics industry. Not surprisingly, this industry
has the highest volume of IPO (979 IPOs). On a percentage basis, about 4.8 % of the
IPO firms in this industry were ultimately sued. Interestingly, IPO firms in the apparel
industry faced the highest litigation risk (16.7%) during our sample period.
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
Table 2 provides more detailed information regarding the lawsuits filed against
our sample firms. Panel A gives details on the nature of the primary alleged fraud in each
complaint. The vast majority of suits allege "material misstatements" and "failure to
disclose relevant information". 17 Specifically, "failure to disclose material adverse
information and known risks", and "overoptimistic forecasts" represent a big portion of
the claims (nearly 40%). Another nearly 40% of all sued firms are accused of
misrepresenting their financial condition, engaging in earnings manipulations or violating
GAAP standards. In each case, the firm is accused of having undertaken those actions in
an attempt to fraudulently boost the company's offer price.
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
17 This finding is consistent with the observation of DuCharme et al. (2004) regarding IPO and SEO related
securities class action litigation.
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Panel B of Table 2 describes the outcome of our sample lawsuits. Forty-three of
the 81 suits were settled, 24 were dismissed or withdrawn, and 13 were still pending as of
the end of 2008. There is one case for which we are unable to determine the outcome.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
Panel C of Table 2 provides information on the timing of our sample lawsuits. In
addition, Figure 1 depicts a typical time line for an IPO-related securities class action.
The class action period starts on the IPO date when the final prospectus is issued. The
mean and median lawsuit in our sample has a class period (a period during which the
shareholders were negatively affected by the alleged fraud) of 229 and 173 days,
respectively. The median number of days from the start (end) of the class period to the
filing date is 274 (25) days, respectively. The time line varies significantly across
lawsuits: 25% of the lawsuits have a class action period of less than 80 days while 25%
of the lawsuits have a class action period of more than 293 days. Regarding the length of
time between the G?? date and the filing date, 25% of the lawsuits are filed in less than
four months while another 25% are filed after more than 444 days. Typically, lawsuits are
required to be filed within three years after the initial public offering. However, our
sample contains two lawsuits that are filed more than three years after the IPO and the
maximum time from the offer date to the lawsuit filing date is 1,172 days, which is a little
more than three years and two months.18 Furthermore, we find that 50 out of our 81 cases
are filed within one year of the IPO, 25 in the second year after the IPO, and 6 in the third
year or afterwards.
18 The three-year deadline for lawsuit filings (also referred to as the statute of litigations) may be extended





We begin by using conditional paired logistic regression to determine which of
the hypothesized explanatory variables affect the incidence of IPO-related lawsuits,
comparing 81 sued companies to the 81 " innocent" firms. Specifically, we consider the
following logistic regression model:
Suitj = ß0 + Ek=i ßk * Equity lncentiveskl + S"=?+? ßm * governance variablesmi +
S?=?+1 ßn^ni + e? (1)
Where Suit is equal to one if there is a lawsuit, and zero otherwise. Equity
incentives include incentives from pre-IPO options and equity ownership; the governance
variables include a CEO-Chairman dummy and the percentage of insiders on the board,
and XM+1)i... XNi are a variety of control factors and other variables of interest that we
hypothesize to influence an IPO firm's litigation risk.
Burns and Kedia (2006) suggest that incentives for accounting fraud should be
associated with the use of stock options beyond the desired level. They refer to the
"excessive" use of options as the abnormal option sensitivity of the CEO's compensation
package. Similar to Burns and Kedia, we perform additional tests in which we adopt a
two-stage estimation procedure to measure the CEO's abnormal option and equity
sensitivity. A preliminary correlation analysis suggest that several control variables in our
model are correlated with pre-IPO options and equity ownership, which suggests that
they may also be determinants of the CEO's compensation structure (salary and bonus)
and equity ownership. To find the appropriate factors that can determine the desired
level of equity incentives, we refer to John and John (1993), Kedia and Mozumdar
28
(2002), and Weber and Dudney (2003) and regress the CEO's equity incentives and
compensation on CEO age, CEO tenure, company age, board size, a CEO founder
dummy, a CEO chair dummy, total assets, R&D, leverage, tangibility, profitability, and a
VC-backing dummy as follows (first stage):
Equity Incentives =
CC0+CC1 In(CEO age) + U2 In(I + CEO tenure) + a31?(1 + company age) + U4 \n(board size) +
a5founder dummy + a6CE0 Chair dummy + U7 ln(totai assets) + aBR&D/TA + a9TD/TA +
a10PPE/TA + alx0lBD/TA + a12VC dummy + e (2)
Ln(bonus) =
U0+U1 In(CEO age) + a2 In(I + CEO tenure) + a3ln(l + company age) + U4 \n(board size) +
asfounder dummy + a6CE0 Chair dummy + a7 in(total assets) + a8R&D/TA + a9TD/TA +
a1QPPE/TA + U11OlBDfTA + a12VC dummy + e (3)
Ln(salary) =
aQ+a-L In(CEO age) + a2 In(I + CEO tenure) + a31?(1 + company age) + a4 \n{board size) +
a5founder dummy + a6CE0 Chair dummy + a7 in(total as s) + a8R&.D/TA + a9TD/TA +
a10PPE/TA + U11OIBD/TA + U12VC dummy + e (4)
The residuals from these cross-sectional regressions represent the portion of
salary and bonus compensation as well as equity incentives that are unexplained. We
therefore include each of these residuals as the explanatory variables in the second stage
logistic regression.
K M
Suitj = ßo + y ßk * abnormal incentiveski + 2_. ßm* governance variables,,
fc=l
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In this section we first describe our measures of CEO compensation and CEO
incentives that are related to litigation risk. In addition, we define other variables that are
used to control for known determinants of litigation risk. For a comprehensive overview
of all variables used in this study and their sources, please refer to Appendix 1.
6.2.1. Executive compensation and equity ownership variables
The compensation and incentive variables we examine are cash compensation and
equity incentives, including incentives from equity ownership and incentives from pre-
IPO options.
Following Cheng and Warfield (2005), pre-IPO option incentives are measured as
the number of shares underlying pre-IPO options deflated by total shares outstanding
(pre-IPO) of the firm.
Similar to option incentives, incentives from CEO ownership are measured as the
number of shares held by the CEO (including the CEO's immediate family members, and
shares in trusts associated with the CEO) as a fraction of shares outstanding prior to the
G??.
The aggregate CEO incentives arising from options and shareholdings are the sum
of incentives of each element (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Denis et al. 2006; Bergstresser
and Philippon 2006), i.e. they are defined as follows:
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Aggregate CEO incentives = incentives from pre — IPO options + incentives from pre —
IPO stock ownership (6)
CEO shareholdings and pre-IPO options benefit from a higher offer price as the
inflated price gives the CEOs a potential gain from liquidating his positions after the
lockup period, holding the aftermarket price constant. To measure the magnitude of the
number of pre-IPO options and equity holdings, we compute the hypothetical gains from
each $1 increase in the offer price (holding the aftermarket price constant) as follows:
Ex - ante gain from manipulating information = number of pre - IPO option holdings +
number of pre — IPO equity holdings (7)
The variable Bonus captures the bonus awards to executives during the year prior
to the IPO and is measured as Ln (1 + bonus). The variable Salary represents the salary
received by executives during the year prior to the IPO and is measured as Ln (1+ salary).
Salary is a minimum fixed payment a manager receives irrespective of the performance
of the company within a given year. By this definition, salary levels are not linked to
changes in the firm's stock price. Therefore, we expect no association between salary and
19 We assume that the delta of the pre-IPO options in the executive's portfolio is equal to one. One may
argue that this is approximately true for options that are deep in the money, but it is less accurate for
options that are out of the money. However, since there is no public market trading before the IPO, it is not
feasible to estimate the delta for pre-IPO options using Black-Scholes' (1973) formula without knowing the
stock price. Another problem that prevents us from calculating the options' delta is that from the
prospectuses and proxy statements, we cannot find all the information on past option grants such as the
exercise price and the time to maturity. Lowry and Murphy (2007) point out that options issued prior to an
IPO often carry nominal exercise prices (such as 10 cent to $1.00) that are seldom challenged by the SEC,
1RS, or FASB as being below fair market value. Many pre-IPO options in our sample have extraordinarily
low exercise prices and the average exercise prices of the pre-IPO options in our sample are much lower
than the offer price (assuming the offer price is the current market price when measuring delta); therefore,
the assumption that the delta of the executive's option portfolio equals one is unlikely to bias our results in
any significant way. To further assure that the delta of pre-IPO options is close to one, we use similar back-
of-the-envelope calculations as those used by Lowry and Murphy (2007) to estimate delta. Our results
suggest that the deltas of pre-IPO options are indeed very close to one.
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the likelihood of fraud. Prior studies such as those by Denis et al. (2006) and Peng and
Roell (2007) do not detect any relation between bonuses and the incidence of litigation.
Peng and Roell attribute the lack of a significant relation to the fact that the impact of
bonuses is small relative to the impact of options after firms started to shift from bonus to
option plans in the 1990s. Regarding bonus plans, Gao and Shrieves (2002) point out that
they are highly firm-specific and that it is difficult to obtain information on how or
whether the structure of a given bonus plan changes after the IPO. Therefore, we do not
make any predictions regarding the sign and magnitude of the association between
bonuses and litigation risk.
6.2.2. Control variables
In our litigation risk model, we control for auditor and underwriter quality. The
extant literature suggests that there is less uncertainty surrounding issues whose values
are certified by high quality players (cf., Ritter, 1984; Carter and Manaster, 1990;
Michaely and Shaw, 1994). Underwriters and auditors may have valuable reputations to
protect; therefore, they may have incentives to completely fulfill their fiduciary duty and
precisely portray information regarding the value of the G?? firm (cf., Lowry and Shu,
2002). Thus, offers involving prestigious underwriters or auditors may be unlikely to
attract a lawsuit. However, as underwriters and auditors can also be named as
codefendants, the 'deep pockets' theory (Alexander, 1991) suggests that prestigious
underwriters or auditors attract more lawsuits as plaintiffs may get more potential
benefits. 20
20 Note that we exclude laddering cases in which underwriters are listed as lead defendants, but that we do
not exclude cases in which underwriters are named as co-defendants alongside offering firms.
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We further control for offer size. As such, we follow Ducharme et al. (2004) who
find that if the offer is small, the potential loss to investors is also small. They argue that
the fixed costs of litigation will discourage investors to sue a firm over a small offer.
Thus, small offers reduce the possibility of IPO firms being sued.
In line with the information asymmetry theory, IPOs backed by venture capitalists
are generally expected to have better governance and operations and thus face a lower
risk of being sued. However, the 'deep pockets' argument made above can also be
extended to venture capital backed IPO firms as shareholders can potentially recover
damages from a venture capitalist (Lowry and Shu, 2002). We capture this effect by
adding a dummy variable to our model that equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital backed
and 0 otherwise.
In addition, we add a dummy variable for IPO options, namely, options issued to
executives on the IPO date with an exercise price that equals the offer price. The effect of
IPO options on the likelihood of managerial fraud may be ambiguous. Past literature
argues that executives purposefully lower their firm's offer price to have a lower option
exercise price although the empirical evidence is inconsistent. IPO options may thus
reduce the likelihood of executives committing fraud as the inflated offer price also
inflates the exercise price, which provides no benefit to the executives.
Furthermore, we include IPO underpricing as measured by the percentage return
from the offer price to the first-day closing price as a control variable. This variable is
added based on the litigation-risk hypothesis (see, for example, Logue, 1973; Ibbotson,
1975; Tinic, 1988; and Lowry and Shu, 2002). Under the deterrence effect of the
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litigation risk hypothesis (Lowry and Shu, 2002), firms have an incentive to underprice
their shares to reduce the likelihood of future litigation brought against them by investors
whose wealth is damaged by the poor performance of the firm's stock.
We control for firm characteristics and offer characteristics. Specifically, we
control for firm size, asset tangibility, firm age, leverage, growth opportunities, and
profitability at the end of last fiscal year prior to IPO. Older firms tend to perform better
both before and after the IPO (Ritter 1998). Therefore, we expect younger firms to be
riskier and to be sued more often. We include leverage measured by total debt scaled by
total assets to control for the possibility that financially distressed firms have stronger
incentives to commit fraud than firms that are not distressed (Begley et al., 1996;
Erickson et al., 2006). Asset tangibility, measured as tangible assets divided by total
assets, is added based on the argument that firms with more tangible assets, on average,
have more stable earnings and are, therefore, less risky (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We
include R&D expense as a proxy for growth opportunities and operating income over
assets as a proxy for profitability. Wang (2005) in his theoretical model shows that a
firm's propensity of committing fraud is positively related to growth potential and
negatively related to the profitability of the firm's current assets.
We also control for CEO characteristics such as CEO age, CEO tenure, and a
dummy that indicates whether the CEO is a founder. CEO with a longer tenure may have
more power to influence other executives to help commit fraud and older CEOs who are
closer to retirement may incur smaller reputational damages if caught committing a
crime, and may therefore be more likely to commit fraud (John et al., 2009). On the other
34
hand, new CEOs may have limited knowledge of the finn and may therefore lack the
ability to deter fraud or be over-optimistic regarding the firm's prospects. Therefore, we
expect a positive relation between CEO age and the risk of litigation but do not provide
prediction regarding the relation between CEO tenure and litigation risk. A founder CEO
may overestimate the strength and long-term prospects of their firms, which may result in
poor management decisions (cf., Certo et al., 2001). This over-optimism may lead to a
higher risk of litigation. Finally, we include an exchange dummy. Firms listed on the
Nasdaq are often viewed as being more risky which is likely to increase these firms' legal
exposure (Lowry and Shu, 2002).
7. Empirical results
7.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and provides results for a series of univariate
tests used to compare the characteristics of sued and non-sued firms. Note that the
univariate comparisons are only descriptive in nature because they implicitly assume that
other potentially relevant factors are fixed, which may not be the case. Therefore, our
main inferences are based on the multivariate tests performed later.
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
Panel A of Table 3 describes the compensation and ownership characteristics of
our sample firms. The corresponding test results suggest no significant difference
between the incentives CEOs derive from pre-IPO options in sued or non-sued firms
although the mean and median sued firm values are higher than those of non-sued firms.
However, the mean incentives from pre-G?? ownership are significantly higher at the 5%
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level in sued firms than in non-sued firms. We find that 20% of the CEOs in sued firms
own IPO options compared to 27% of the CEOs in non-sued firms. However, the
difference is not statistically significant. The mean ex-ante gain from a dollar increase in
the offer price for sued firms is 4.41 million compared to 2.51 million for non-sued firms.
The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The data in Panel A reveal few
differences in the bonus structure between sued and non-sued firms. However, the mean
and median CEO salary is significantly higher at the 5% level in sued firms than in non-
sued firms (262 thousand and 227 thousand, respectively, for sued firms, compared to
219 and 205 thousand for non-sued firms).
Panel B of Table 3 provides information regarding EPO characteristics. The mean
and median offer size of the sued-firm IPOs is about $106 million and $77 million,
respectively, compared to $80 and $60 million, respectively, for non-sued IPOs. The
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in both the mean and median. The
initial underpricing return equals 13.54% for sued firms and 13.41% for non-sued firms.
Consistent with the findings of Lowry and Shu (2002), there is no significant difference
between the initial return of sued and non-sued firms from the univariate test. In addition,
we do not find any significant differences between sued and non-sued firms in terms of
auditor quality, underwriter rank, VC-backing or exchange listing (NASDAQ vs. non-
NASDAQ).
Panel C of Table 3 describes the firm characteristics of sued and non-sued firms
for the most recent fiscal year prior to the offering date. The average sued firm in the
sample is 9.5 years old (vs.7 years for non-sued firms), has assets and revenues of $133.7
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and $100.8 million, respectively (vs. $100.6 and $82.7 million for non-sued firms,
respectively), was financed 32% by debt (vs. 24% for non-sued firms), and had a
tangibility ratio of 22% (vs. 19% for non-sued firms). The sued firms have an average
operating income over total assets of -18.02% (vs. -27.26% for non-sued firms) and have
a R&D ratio of 20% (vs. 18% for non-sued firms). None of the differences in the mean
and median values of sued and non-sued firm characteristics are statistically significant
except for the leverage ratio. The higher leverage ratio for sued firms may suggest that
sued firms tend to be more likely to be financially distressed and thus face a higher
litigation risk.
Finally, Panel D of Table 3 provides information on CEO traits and characteristics
the board of directors. Founders lead 41% of the sued firms and 37% of non-sued firms.
CEOs chair about 51% of sued-firm boards and 53% of non-sued-firm boards. The
average board size is 6.6 for sued firms and 6.9 for non-sued firms. The CEOs are on
average 48 years old with a tenure of 4.5 years for sued firms and on average 46 years old
with a tenure of 5.3 years for non-sued firms. None of the differences in the mean and
median values of these variables above are statistically significant. However, the boards
in sued firms tend to be dominated by inside directors (32% on average, compared to
27% for non-sued firms). The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
7.2. Regression results (with normal equity incentives)
Table 4 reports the results of a conditional logistic regression estimating the effect
of CEO incentives and a variety of other factors on the incidence of shareholder lawsuits.
The parameter estimates do not include an intercept because it is impossible to uniquely
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identify an intercept in a 1:1 matched pair conditional logistic regression. Based on the
likelihood ratio chi-square statistics, all models are significant at the 10 percent level
except for model five, whose p-value is 0.14. The pseudo R2 is similar in magnitude
across all models. We measure CEO incentives in two models, a full model and a
parsimonious model. In the parsimonious model, we include variables which are
generated from a stepwise logistic regression and other interested variables.
In model 1 and 2, we focus our attention on a CEO's aggregate equity incentives.
As expected, the sign of the coefficients for equity incentives for the full model and the
parsimonious model are positive, indicating a positive relationship between a CEO's
aggregate equity incentives and the incidence of shareholder litigation. The relationship is
statistically significant at the five percent level in both the full (model 1) and
parsimonious model (model 2). As we use shareholder litigation as a proxy for a CEO's
misconduct during the IPO process, we interpret our result that CEOs who have more
aggregate equity incentives are more likely to manipulate information during the IPO
process and inflate the offer price. When we divide the aggregate equity incentives into
incentives that are derived from pre-IPO options and incentives form pre-IPO equity
ownership (model 3 and 4), we find consistent results. Both pre-G?? options and pre-G??
equity holdings provide an incentive to CEOs to manipulate information and inflate the
offer price. When we measure the incentives derived from pre-IPO options and equity
holdings in terms of the ex-ante gain a CEO would derive from a hypothetical one dollar
increase in the offer price (model 5 and model 6), we get similarly significant results. In
general, hypothesis 1 is supported by our results. In terms of cash compensation, the
signs of the coefficients for salary and bonuses are both negative, indicating that cash
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compensation mitigates the incidence of fraud. However, consistent with previous
findings, this relationship is insignificant in most of the models (Model 3 suggests a
marginal significance for bonuses at a 10.7% and Model 4 at a 12.7% significance level).
While we hypothesize that the expected payoffs of CEOs from manipulating information
are affected by their compensation and equity ownership structure, the probability of
detection is affected by the composition of the board of directors. We find a positive
relationship between insider-dominated boards and the incidence of shareholder litigation
(hypothesis 2). The relationship is significant in most of the models except for model 1
and 3. This result indicates that firms that have a higher proportion of top managers on
the board are more likely to face securities class action litigations, possibly because
insider-dominated boards are more likely to comply with the CEO's decision and that the
lack of outside directors' monitoring increases the likelihood of company fraud. Efendi et
al. (2007) find evidence that suggests that combining CEO and board chair positions
increases the likelihood of accounting irregularities. In contrast, we do not find a
significant relationship between our CEO-Chairman dummy and the likelihood of
shareholder litigation. As such, our results are more in line with Agrawal and Chadha
(2005) who find no relation between these variables for seasoned firms and Agrawal and
Cooper's (2009) results for IPO firms.
Another interesting finding in Table 4 is that there is a significant relationship
between CEO traits and the incidence of shareholder litigation. We find that CEO age is
positively related to the likelihood of shareholder litigation at the five percent
significance level in Model 1 and Model 5, and at the one percent level in all other
models. This result is consistent with our prediction that younger CEOs may be more
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concerned about their reputation which is a valuable asset for their future career.
Therefore, younger CEOs tend to manipulate information less frequently during the IPO
process, leading to a reduced possibility of shareholder litigation. In terms of the relation
between the length of tenure and the incidence of litigation, we made no prediction on the
expected sign. However, our findings strongly suggest that the length of CEO tenure is
significantly negatively related to the incidence of shareholder litigation throughout all of
our models. We offer two explanations for this result. Due to the limited knowledge
about the firm possessed by the new CEOs, they may lack the necessary insight to spot
and deter fraud if it is committed by other officers and may be over-optimistic regarding
the firm's prospects, which - when uncovered - may lead to shareholder litigation. In
addition, the founder CEO variable is positive and statistically significant in all models.
This indicates that founder-led IPO firms are more likely to be sued. We argue that the
higher litigation risk for firms led by founder CEOs is likely caused by the fact that
founder CEOs tend to lack the business expertise and training a hired professional CEO
typically brings to the job and may overestimate their firms' prospects.
We find no significant relationship between most accounting variables and
litigation risk except for the leverage ratio which is positively related to the litigation risk
at the ten percent significance level in most models. The intuitive interpretation for this
result is that highly leveraged firms may have more incentives to misreport the firm's
prospects to raise more capital through the equity offering to repay their debt obligations.
In addition, the higher debt burden increases the firm's likelihood of financial distress.
We find no significant relationship between the level ofunderpricing and litigation risk in
our matched pair sample, which does not support the deterrence effect of the litigation-
40
risk hypothesis (Lowry and Shu 2002). In addition, the IPO option dummy, the VC-
backing dummy and auditor ranking are insignificant. Consistent with the "deep pocket"
theory and similar to the findings of DuCharme et al. (2004), we find some evidence that
underwriter rank is positively related to the incidence of shareholder litigation. Finally,
we find some evidence that lawsuits are positively related to offer size (Model 2, 3 and
4), which may be caused by the fact that investors are not eager to sue a firm over a small
offer given the fixed cost of litigation.
7.3. Regression results (with abnormal equity incentives)
In Table 5, we focus our attention on abnormal equity incentives. As discussed in
our methodology section, abnormal equity incentives are incentives that go beyond the
desired level and cannot be explained by factors such as CEO age, CEO tenure, firm
characteristics, and etc. We expect the "excessive" incentives from pre-IPO options and
pre-IPO equity ownership to be positively related to CEO misconducts during the IPO
process that subsequently lead to shareholder litigation. The coefficient of abnormal
equity incentives is positive and significant at the five percent level in all models. The
results for all other variables are similar to those in Table 4. In general, our results
suggest that CEOs whose incentives from pre-G?? options and equity ownership deviate
from optimal incentive levels during the IPO process are more likely to be associated
with sued firms.
7.4. Regression results high techfirms vs. non-high techfirms
As our sample is dominated by technology stocks, our results may be influenced
by some special traits of high tech firms. To ensure the robustness of our results, we
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therefore partition our sample of sued firms into two groups: high tech firms and non-
high tech firms. We then re-estimate the models separately for each subsample. Due to
the matching criteria we employ in our analysis, (we matched by 2-digit SIC codes),
some control firms of high tech sued firms are not actually high tech firms. By the same
token, some control firms of non-high tech sued firms are actually high tech firms.
Therefore, we lose some observations which in turn reduces the number of matched pairs
in both subsamples. To have a more accurate and strict definition of high tech firms, we
refer to the AeA definition to indentify firms in the high tech industry (see Appendix 2).
The results of the sub-sample tests are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, we find
some significant differences in the results between the high tech and non-high tech
subsample. In terms of equity incentives, we find a significant association between equity
incentives and the incidence of shareholder litigation in all models for the high tech
subsample although the significance level is reduced compared with the full sample test
results in Table 4 and 5. In contrast, equity incentives in the non-high tech subsample are
consistently insignificant although the signs of the coefficients are positive as expected.
In the high-tech subsample, we find some evidence to support the deterrence effect of the
litigation risk hypothesis (Lowry and Shu, 2002). The initial return of high tech firms is
negatively related to the incidence of lawsuit at litigation at the ten percent significance
level (models 1 and 2), suggesting that higher underpricing reduces the likelihood of
firms being sued. In addition, the length of CEO tenure and the leverage ratio are only
significant in the high tech sub-sample. We find only weak evidence that insider-
dominated boards increase a firm's litigation risk. Underwriter ranking and the CEO
founder dummy are insignificant in all models although the sign of the coefficient is
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unchanged when compared with the full sample results. Lastly, CEO age is positively
related to litigation risk in both the high tech subsample and the non-high tech subsample.
Overall, our results suggest that the positive association between CEO equity
incentives and litigation risk is only pervasive for high tech firms. In addition, the length
of CEO tenure and the leverage ratio appear to be related to incidence of shareholder
litigation only in high tech firms. Furthermore, high tech firms tend to underprice their
shares more to avoid future litigation. CEO age appears to be significantly related to
litigation risk for both subsamples as well as the full sample.
7.5. Regression results non-accounting relatedfraud vs. accounting relatedfraud
In Table 2, we can see that a significant portion of the lawsuits in our sample
allege that the company failed to disclose material adverse information or risks and/or
made overoptimistic forecasts. Such claims are clearly different from cases that allege
accounting fraud and one may argue that top executives may not intentionally hide risks
or make overoptimistic forecasts, but instead simply fail to realize the potential risk of
their firms or are over-confident about their firms' prospects. Intuitively, accounting
related fraud seems to be more closely associated with CEO incentives. In order to
examine whether non-accounting related fraud is also associated with CEO incentives,
we partition the full sample of sued cases into two groups: accounting related cases and
non-accounting related cases.
Table 7 reports the results for the respective subsample tests. As expected, the
CEO equity incentives are positively related to the incidence of accounting-related
shareholder litigation. However, we also find evidence that CEO equity incentives are
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positively associated with the incidence of non-accounting related shareholder litigation
(models 4 and 5) although the significance level is lower than that in the accounting-
related subsample. In terms of other variables, the two subsamples generate different
results. Only CEO age is significantly positively related to the incidence of accounting
and non-accounting related lawsuits for both samples.
7. 6. Additional sensitivity analyses
To examine the robustness of our results, we conduct various sensitivity tests. Our
results are reported in Table 8. First, we re-estimate the conditional logistic regressions,
varying the time horizons over which sued firms are included in the sample. Specifically,
we experiment with different cut-off dates. For example, the coefficients reported in the
first column are obtained after discarding lawsuits that occurred more than a year after
the IPO. The second column contains results in which we employ a 2-year benchmark.
The results for the 1-year and 2-year windows yield similar inferences about the CEO
equity incentives although the significance level is reduced. Other variables such as the
percentage of insiders on the board, CEO age, CEO tenure, the CEO founder dummy, and
the leverage ratio remain statistically significant.
Next, we exclude lawsuits that were dismissed, withdrawn or whose outcome is
still pending (column 3). Dismissed or withdrawn cases suggest that the judge or the
plaintiffs themselves conclude that the events leading to the lawsuit could not contribute
to the IPO process. Lowry and Shu (2002) point out that dismissals and withdrawals
indicate weak evidence, suggesting that the respective cases should never have been
brought in the first place. Pending cases are cases whose final outcome is not yet
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determined. For these reasons, dismissed/withdrawn and pending lawsuits may add noise
to the study. When we re-estimate the conditional logistic model 4 in Table 4 after
excluding these cases, the results are qualitatively unchanged.
Last, we conduct unconditional logistic regression (model 4) and use white
standard errors and covariance (model 5) to re-estimate the model. The results are
generally qualitatively unchanged.
8. Conclusions
The main purpose of our study is to investigate the relationship between the
incidence of IPO-related shareholder litigation and CEO equity incentives on one hand
and a series of corporate governance factors on the other hand. We make several
contributions to the existing literature. First, our paper is the first study to examine what
aspects of an executive's compensation package, his/her personal traits, and the firm's
corporate governance mechanisms that are in place prior to the IPO affect the incidence
of IPO-related shareholder litigation. Second, our study is the first to explore how the
determinants of IPO litigation vary across different types of industries (high-tech vs. non-
tech) and across different types of allegations (accounting-related vs. non-accounting
related cases).
Our empirical analysis employs a sample of 162 sued and non-sued IPO firms (81
matched pairs) and performs a conditional logistic regression to explore the determinants
of an IPO firm's litigation risk. Our full sample results indicate that firms in which CEOs
have higher equity incentives from pre-IPO options and pre-IPO equity ownership are
more likely to face shareholder litigation. We interpret the results as being consistent with
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a "dark side" of incentive compensation, which motivate top executives to commit fraud
by artificially inflating the firm's offer price. As such, our results are broadly consistent
with Becker's (1968) economic theory of crime. Similar to prior findings for seasoned
firms (Denis et al., 2006; Peng and Roell, 2007), salary and bonuses are not significantly
related to shareholder litigation. We also find some evidence that firms whose board is
dominated by insiders and thus lacks outside monitoring face a higher risk of litigation.
In addition, we find that CEO traits including CEO age, CEO tenure, and CEOs being
founders are related to the probability of an IPO firm being sued. Specifically, IPO firms
led by older CEOs, CEOs with a longer tenure, or CEOs who also founded the firm are
more likely to be sued. Finally, we find evidence that suggests that highly leveraged firms
are more likely to be sued.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we also perform a test in which we focus
on abnormal CEO equity incentives, i.e. incentives beyond the desired level. We find that
abnormal equity incentives are significantly positively related to the incidence of
shareholder litigation, suggesting that CEOs have "excessive" incentives from pre-IPO
options and equity ownership during the IPO process that drive them to perform actions
that result in the firm being sued.
Our subsample tests (high tech vs. non-high tech) provide interesting insights into
the determinants of litigation risk across different industry sectors. Specifically, we find
that the positive association between CEO equity incentives and litigation risk is more
pervasive in high tech firms than in non-high tech firms. Furthermore, the deterrence
effect of litigation risk hypothesis (Lowry and Shu, 2002) is only supported in the high-
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tech subsample, suggesting that high tech firms tend to underprice their shares more to
avoid future litigation. Another subsample test in which we focus on accounting related
vs. non-accounting related cases suggest CEO equity incentives are positively related to
the incidence of shareholder litigation in both subsamples, indicating that CEO incentives
are not only associated with accounting related fraud, but also with non-accounting
related fraud.
Finally, our results are robust when we consider different sample periods during
which firms are included in the sample and when we exclude dismissed/withdrawn and
pending cases.
Although our findings indicate a robust association between CEO equity
incentives and fraud allegations, there are two possible explanations for our findings.
First, equity incentives might cause top managers to be more likely to engage in
fraudulent activity, which leads to higher litigation risk. Second, firms in which CEOs
have high equity incentives might be more likely to be sued because they appear to have
a financial motive for fraud. We favor the first interpretation as we use private
shareholder litigation as a proxy of fraud. However, we do not reject the potential validity
of the second explanation. To add some additional insights into this question, future
studies in this area could distinguish between firms that were targeted by a parallel SEC
enforcement action. Given that the SEC has no financial incentives to prosecute a given
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Table 1: Sample distribution across years and industries
The sample consists of 2,268 IPOs between 1997 and 2007 that are provided in the Securities Data
Company (SDC) database. Closed-end funds, REITs, financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6900), unit offerings,
reverse LBOs, spinoffs, ADRs, and foreign issues are excluded. Sued firms are Identified through Stanford
University's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu) and the Securities Class
Action Alert (SCAA). Laddering cases filed against the underwriters in which issuers are named as co-
defendants are excluded from our sample. Panel A classifies the total number of IPOs and the number of
IPOs that were sued by year. Panel B classifies the firms by industry where industries are identified based
on SIC codes.




















































Total 81 2,268 3.57
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B : Sample distribution across industries
Industry SIC codes
Number of IPOs % of IPOs
No. of IPOs sued under sued under













































































Total 2,268 81 3.6
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Table 2 (continued)
Table 2: Nature, resolution, and timing of lawsuits
This table provides summary statistics for our IPO litigation sample. In Panel A, we identify the nature of
lawsuits by carefully reading the case summary for each lawsuit in our sample as provided by Stanford
University's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) (http://securities.stanford.edu). Because some
lawsuits involve multiple allegations, the number of allegations (88) exceeds the number of lawsuits (81)
in our sample. Panel B provides information on the resolution of lawsuits. We search the SCAC, the
Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA) and the Department of Justice Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) (http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov) database to determine how each lawsuit was resolved.
Panel C reports information on the timing of lawsuits. Specifically, we obtain the length of the class
period, the time between the lawsuit filing date and the IPO date and the time between the lawsuit filing
date and the ending date of the class period. Finally, Panel D categorizes the litigation sample based on
the length of time between the IPO date and lawsuit filing date.
Panel A: Nature of allegations
Nature of legal claim Number of cases Percentage of total
Failure to disclose material adverse
information/known risks and Overoptimistic
forecasts
Failure to disclose existing business problems
Misrepresentations about financial condition
Revenue management / Expense management
/ Earnings management























Panel C: Timing of lawsuits
Mean Minimum Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Maximum Std Dev
Length of the class action
period (days)
Length of time between the
lawsuit filing date and the
IPO date (days)
Length of time between the
lawsuit filing date and the



















Panel D: Distribution of lawsuits by time to filing
No. of lawsuits filed










Table 3: Characteristics of sued vs. non-sued firms
The sample consists of 81 IPO firms (issued between 1997 and 2007) that were subsequently sued in connection with
their offering. The control group consists of 81 firms that were matched with the sample firms based on size, year and
industry. Compensation and ownership data as well as boards and CEO traits are obtained from IPO prospectuses and
proxy statements. IPO characteristics are obtained from SDC but are cross-referenced with each firm's IPO
prospectus. In case of discrepancies between SDC data entries and IPO prospectus information, the latter data are
used. Firm characteristics are obtained from Compustat. Information on Stock prices (used to calculate the initial
returns) is obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) database. Definitions for all variables are
given in Appendix 1. All dollar values are based on inflation-adjusted 2007 dollars. In Panel A, we compare the
compensation and ownership characteristics of the CEOs in our two subsamples of sued and non-sued firms. In Panels
B and C, we compare the offering and firm characteristics of the IPOs in each subsample. In Panel D, we compare the
board characteristics and CEO traits among the two subsamples. The first column labels our variables. In columns 2
and 3 (columns 4 and 5), we present information on the mean and median variable values for sued (non-sued) firms,
respectively. In the last two columns, we present p-value for a t-test and Wilcoxon test for the difference in mean and
median values between our two subsamples. Significant differences are highlighted in italics.
















Ex-ante gain from a
dollar increase in the
offer price ($ million)








Panel B: IPO characteristics
Price per share ($)








































12.55 13.00 (0.047) (0.014)
79.51 58.80 (0.027) (0.003)
34.64% 13.41% (0.955) (0.642)
0.95 1.00 (0.109) (0.180)
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Panel B (continued)
VC- backed dummy 0.59 1.00 0.64 1.00 (0.453) (0.460)
Underwriter rank 7.96 8.50 7.72 9.00 (0.313) (0.570)
Proportion of firms Q g3 1QQ Qgi 1QQ (Q 15?)listed on the Nasdaq
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Total assets ($ million) 133.75 37.26 100.62 36.93 (0.280) (0.764)
Sales ($ million) 100.80 33.64 82.75 29.96 (0.329) (0.143)
Firm Age (years) 9.5 7.0 10.5 7.0 (0.366) (0.647)
OIBD/TA(%) -18.02 -0.22 -27.26 2.98 (0.872) (0.947)
TD/TA(%) 32.48 22.52 23.74 14.86 (0.083) (0.198)
R&D/TA(%) 20.46 5.70 18.33 9.92 (0.762) (0.570)
PPEAA (%) 21.93 14.42 19.16 13.52 (0.288) (0.562)
Panel D: Board and CEO traits
Proportion of firms in
which the CEO chairs 0.51 1.00 0.53 1.00 (0.754) (0.875)
the board
Proportion of firms Q32 Q 2g Q 2? Q 25 {QQ23) (0Q54)
with inside directors
Proportion of firms QM QQQ Q 3? 000 (Q 615) (Q 6ig)
with founder CEOs
Board size 6.59 6.00 6.9 7.0 (0.200) (0.178)
CEO age 48 48 46 46 (0.142) (0.112)
CEO tenure 4.5 3.0 5.3 4.0 (0.280) (0.326)
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Table 4: Conditional matched-pair logistic regression
We perform a conditional matched-pair logistic regression to predict an IPO firm's likelihood of being named in a
prospectus liability case. The dependent variable is one if the firm is the target of an IPO-related securities class action
lawsuit and zero otherwise. Our main incentive measures are measured as the number of pre-IPO shares or options
held by a CEO deflated by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The ex-ante gain from inflating the offer price
equals the number of shares held by the CEO, plus the number of pre-IPO options owned by the CEO, in millions. Our
sued-firm sample consists of 81 IPO firms (issued between 1997 and 2007) that were the target of a prospectus
liability case. The control group consists of 81 firms that were matched with our sample firms based on size, industry,
and IPO year. Definitions for all variables are given in Appendix 1. Missing data on certain explanatory variables limit
the sample size in some regressions. The predicted signs for each regressor are provided in parentheses besides the
variable names. One-tailed test is applied for directional hypotheses. To denote statistical significance, we use *** for
the 1% level, ** for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Aggregate equity incentives (+)
Incentives from pre-IPO options (+)




% Insiders on the board (+)
CEO chairman dummy (?)
IPO option dummy (?)




























































































VC- backed dummy (?) 0.170 0.545 0.160
(0.790) (0.429) (0.778)
Underpricing (?) 0.120 0.103 0.074
(0.782) (0.823) (0.856)
Ln(Assets) (?) 0.199 0.198 0.284 0.355 0.016 -0.001
(0.637) (0.614) (0.541) (0.439) (0.967) (0.997)
OIBD/TA(?) 0.501 0.532 0.432
(0.638) (0.634) (0.648)
TD/TA(+) 1.580* 1.286* 1.8552** 1.436* 1.084 0.953
(0.079) (0.081) (0.050) (0.065) (0.112) (0.109)
PPE/TA(?) -0.280 0.235 0.474
(0.859) (0.888) (0.744)
R&D/TA(?) 1.133 1.095 0.773
(0.495) (0.568) (0.564)
Ln(I+ firm age) (?) -0.110 0.066 -0.158
(0.813) (0.897) (0.717)
Ln(CEO age) (+) 4.001** 3.906*** 4.701*** 4.340*** 3.506** 3.589***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
Ln(I+ CEO tenure)(?) -0.928** -0.886** -1.176*** -1.111*** -0.701* -0.698**
(0.023) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.053) (0.037)
CEO founder dummy (+) 0.934* 1.030** 1.320** 1.299** 0.961* 0.985**
(0.086) (0.044) (0.042) (0.024) (0.060) (0.040)
Exchange dummy (?) 0.238 0.300 -0.104
(0.807) (0.770) (0.902)
Observations 156 158 156 158 156 158
Model chi-square 31.42 30.66 35.64 34.57 25.64 24.71
p-value 0.088 0.002 0.045 0.001 0.141 0.006
PseudoR2 18.15% 17.64% 20.31% 19.65% 15.07% 14.48%
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Table 5: Conditional matched-pair logistic regression (abnormal incentives)
We perform a conditional matched-pair logistic regression to predict an IPO firm's likelihood of being named in a prospectus liability
case. The dependent variable is one if the firm is the target of an IPO-related securities class action lawsuit and zero otherwise.
Abnormal incentives are incentives that are beyond the desired level that can be explained by other factors. We regress the equity
incentives and cash compensation on CEO age, CEO tenure, company age, board size, a founder dummy, a CEO chair dummy, as well
as the firm's total assets, R&D, leverage, tangibility, profitability and a VC-backed dummy. The residuals (abnormal incentives) from
the first-stage models are then included as independent variables in the corresponding second-stage models. The sample consists of
81 IPO firms (issued between Í997 and 2007) that were the target of a prospectus liability case. The control group consists of 81
firms that were matched with sample firms on size, industry, and IPO year. Definitions for all variables are given in Appendix 1.
Missing data on certain explanatory variables limit the sample size in some regressions. The predicted signs for each regressor are
provided in parentheses besides the variable names. One-tailed test is applied for directional hypotheses. To denote statistical
significance, we use *** for the 1% level, ** for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Abnormal aggregate equity incentives (+)
Abnormal incentives from pre-IPO options (+)
Abnormal incentives from equity ownership (+)
Abnormal incentives from ex-ante gain (+)
Ln(l+salary) (residual) (?)
Ln(l+bonus) (residual) (?)
% insiders on the board (+)






Ln(I+ CEO tenure) (?)






































































































Table 6: Conditional matched-pair logistic regression
(high tech firms vs. non-high tech firms)
We perform a conditional matched-pair logistic regression to predict an IPO firm's likelihood of being named in a
prospectus liability case. The dependent variable is one if the firm is the target of an IPO-related securities class action
lawsuit and zero otherwise. The main sample is partitioned into two groups: sued high tech firms and sued non-high
tech firms. (We distinguish between high-tech and non-tech firms following the classification by American Electronics
Association). For each subsample, we re-estimate the same models we employed in Table 4. Due to the previous
matching criteria and missing data for certain explanatory variables, we get our high tech firms subsample including
31 sued and non-sued firms and non-high firms including 30 sued and non-sued firms. Definitions for all variables are
given in Appendix 1. The predicted signs for each regressor are provided in parentheses besides the variable names.
One-tailed test is applied for directional hypotheses. To denote statistical significance, we use *** for the 1% level, **
for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level.
High tech firms Non-high tech firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Aggregate equity incentives (+)
Incentives from pre-IPO options (+)
Incentives from equity ownership (+)
Incentives from ex-ante gain (+)
Ln(l+bonus) (?)
% Insiders on the board (+)
Underwriter rank (?)












































































































































































Table 7: Conditional matched-pair logistic regression
(accounting related litigation vs. non-accounting related litigation)
We perform a conditional matched-pair logistic regression to predict an IPO firm's likelihood of being named in a prospectus
liability case. The dependent variable is one if the firm is the target of an IPO-related securities class action lawsuit and zero
otherwise. The main sample is partitioned into two groups: accounting related lawsuits and non-accounting related lawsuits.
We then re-estimate the same models we employed in Table 4. Model 1 to 3 are based on a sample of 21 sued firms with
accounting-related cases and their control firms, while models 4 to 6 employ a sample of 55 sued firms with non-accounting
related cases and their control firms. Five sued firms and their non-sued counterparts are excluded due to missing
information on some of our explanatory variables. Definitions for all variables are given in Appendix 1. The predicted signs
for each regressor are provided in parentheses besides the variable names. One-tailed test is applied for directional
hypotheses. To denote statistical significance, we use *** for the 1% level, ** for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level.
Accounting related litigation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-accounting related litigation
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Aggregate equity incentives (+)
Incentives from pre-IPO options (+)
Incentives from equity ownership (+)
Incentives from ex-ante gain (+)
Ln(l+bonus) (?)
% Insiders on the board (+)
Underwriter rank (?)




Ln(I+ CEO tenure) (?)







































































































































































Table 8: Sensitivity analysis and robustness test
We perform a conditional matched-pair logistic regression to predict an IPO firm's likelihood of being named in a prospectus
liability case. The dependent variable is one if the firm is the target of an IPO-related securities class action lawsuit and zero
otherwise. We re-estimate the conditional logistic regressions, varying the time horizons. Coefficients reported in Model 1
are obtained after discarding lawsuits that occurred more than a year after the IPO, Model 2 contains the 2-year benchmark
results. In Model 3, lawsuits that were dismissed or withdrawn are excluded. Model 4 provides the unconditional logistic
regression results and model 5 provides the results of unconditional logistic regression using white standard errors.
Definitions for all variables are given in Appendix 1. Missing data on certain explanatory variables limit the sample size in
some regressions. The predicted signs for each regressor are provided in parentheses besides the variable names. One-tailed
test is applied for directional hypotheses. To denote statistical significance, we use *** for the 1% level, ** for the 5% level,
and * for the 10% level.
Lawsuits Lawsuits








Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept
Incentives from pre-IPO options (+)
Incentives from equity ownership (+)
Ln(l+bonus) (?)
% Insiders on board (+)
Underwriter rank (?)




Ln(I+ CEO tenure) (?)























































































































































Figure 1: The lawsuit timeline
Period prior to the IPO
r
J^
Incentives are measured at
the time immediately prior








The period during which
firms are alleged to have
misled the market
This figure graphically depicts the timeline over which equity incentives are measured.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Variable definitions
Data Sources Description
Primary dependent variable
Suit SCAC, SCAA, PACER Dummy variable (=1 if the firm was sued under Section 1 1 of the
1933 Securities Act within three years of its IPO), constructed
using securities class action litigation data from Stanford's
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), the Securities
Class Action Alert (SCAA), and the U.S. Department of Justice
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database.















Natural logarithm of one plus the amount of salary awarded to
the CEO during the last fiscal year prior to the IPO
Natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value of a bonus
awarded to the CEO during the last fiscal year prior to the IPO
Pre-IPO options (vested and unvested) owned by the CEO
deflated by the number ofpre-IPO shares outstanding
Pre-IPO shares owned by the CEO (including the CEO's
immediate family members, and shares in trusts associated with
the CEO) deflated by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding.
The hypothetical gain a CEO derives from a $1 increase in the
offer price (holding the aftermarket price constant)













Ln(I+ firm age )
PPE/TA
R&D/TA


















Dummy variable (=1 if the offering firm's auditor was a Big
4/6/8 accounting firm, O otherwise)
Scale for underwriter reputation following Ritter, ranging from
1.1 (worst) to 9.1 (best)
Dummy variable (=1 if underwriter rank > 7.1, O otherwise)
Total offer size in millions of dollars
Dummy variable (=1 if the IPO is venture capital backed,
otherwise)
Percentage Return from the offer price to the first day closing
price (CRSP)
Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets at
the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
Natural Logarithm of the book value of assets
Total debt (long term + short term) scaled by total assets
Natural logarithm of one plus the firm's age, where firm age is
defined as the number of years between the firm's founding year
and the year it went public
The proportion of property, plant, and equipment to total assets
The proportion of research and development spending to total
assets
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Ln(number of directors on
the board)









Natural logarithm of the CEO's age at the time of the IPO
Natural logarithm of one plus the CEO's tenure defined as the
number of years the CEO has been the CEO of the company
Dummy variable (= 1 if it the CEO is the firm's founder found, O
otherwise)
Dummy variable (=1 if the Chairman of the Board is also the
CEO, O otherwise)
Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
Percentage of current employees of the firm who serve on the
board
Dummy variable (=1 if stocks are listed on the NASDAQ , O
otherwise)
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Appendix 2: High-Technology Industry Definition
(Source: (http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/Idmk_definition.asp))
"The American Electronics Association (AeA) uses 45 SIC codes to define the
high-technology industry. In an effort to produce solid statistics, AeA's definition consists
of SIC codes that fall into three broad categories - high-tech manufacturing,
communications services, and software and computer-related services. It does not include
broad categories if the high-tech portion does not represent a clear majority. Also, AeA's
definition does not include many "related" industries, such as biotechnology, engineering
services, and research and testing services.
Other industry groups not covered in AeA's definition of the high-tech industry
include wholesale and retail trade of high-tech goods. The biotechnology industry also is
not included because current U.S. government statistics do not allow for a clear
identification of which portion is "bio" and which is "tech." The matter is further
complicated because there is no clear consensus on the definition of the biotechnology
industry.
The American Electronics Association (AeA) uses 45 SIC codes that fall into
three general groupings ~ high-tech manufacturing, communications services, and
software and computer-related services ~ to identify firms in the high-technology
industry ( see below):
HIGH-TECH MANUFACTURING
Computers and Office Equipment
3571 Electronic Computers




3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines
3579 Office Machines
Consumer Electronics
3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment
3652 Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes and Disks
Communications Equipment
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus
3663 Radio and TV Broadcast and Communications Equipment
3669 Other Communications Equipment
Electronic Components and Accessories
3671 Electron Tubes
3672 Printed Circuit Boards
3675 Electronic Capacitors
3676 Electronic Resistors
3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors
3678 Electronic Connectors
3679 Other Electronic Components
Semiconductors




3823 Process Control Instruments
3824 Fluid Meters and Counting Devices
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments
3829 Other Measuring and Controlling Devices
Photonics
3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses
3861 Photographic Equipment and Lenses
Defense Electronics
3812 Search and Navigation Systems, Instruments, and Equipment
Electromedical Equipment
3844 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus





4822 Telegraph and Other Message Communications
4841 Cable and Other Pay Television Services
4899 Other Communications Services
SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER-RELATED SERVICES
Software Services
7371 Computer Programming Services
7372 Prepackaged Software
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design
Data Processing and Information Services
7374 Computer Processing and Data Preparation
7375 Information Retrieval Services
7376 Computer Facilities Management Services
Rental, Maintenance, and Other Computer-Related Services"
7377 Computer Rental and Leasing
7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair
7379 Other Computer-Related Services
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